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The Economics of Golf: An Investigation of
the Returns to Skill of PGA Tour Golfers
Kelsey L. Rinehart
ABSTRACT. Golfers on the Professional Golfers Association (PGA) Tour make up an elite
labor market. The earnings of a PGA Tour golfer are determined by his performances in
tournaments. Using PGA Tour data from 2002 and 2008, this paper explores returns to
skill of PGA golfers and changes in returns to skill over the time period. Greens in
regulation (GIR), putts per GIR, and sand saves are found to be statistically significant.
The analysis in this paper does not provide any support to the idea that returns to skills for
PGA golfers have changed over time.

I. Introduction
Sports provide more measures of worker performance than any other
labor market. At a click of a mouse one has access to an athlete’s
demographic information, experience, salary history, and most
importantly, performance statistics. For most workers, performance can
be difficult to measure because many times it is subjective in nature. This
is not true with sports. Every outcome resulting from an athlete’s action
is a measurable event (Kahn 2000, 75).
Some may question the economic significance of sports. The
professional sports industry is only a drop in the bucket of United States’s
gross domestic product. Although professional sports do not play a large
role in GDP, they are what Fort refers to as “big business” (2003, 2). The
country’s interest in sports goes far beyond a contribution to GDP. The
infatuation with sports is revealed everyday in newscasts, newspapers and
magazines. Media popularity aside, professional sports are like any
operating business. There is a supply of and a demand for the output, and
money to be exchanged (Fort 2003, 2).
Professional golfers make up an elite labor market. Golf is a great
sport to study because of all the available statistics. A professional
golfer’s skill is measured through the statistics kept by either the
Professional Golfers Association (PGA) or the Ladies Professional Golf
Association (LPGA). The statistics are accurate and available The
earnings of a golfer are determined by his performance against other
competitors in a tournament setting (Scully 2002, 236). After each
professional tournament, winnings are reported along with the golfer’s
57
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statistics for the tournament. This paper will explore how various golf
skills affect a PGA Tour golfer’s earnings.

II. The Economics of Golf
In the business world there are inputs, outputs, and various negotiations
that must take place before a final product is produced; professional golf
is no exception. There are groups that must interact in order for one to
enjoy a golf tournament from the comfort of his living room. The most
important group is the golfers. Then there are tournament sponsors who
provide the prize money and arrange tournament locations and television
contracts. The body that mediates between golfers and the sponsors is an
association of professional golfers, such as the PGA or LPGA.
Golfers are the main input to professional golf. For those golfers with
exceedingly high levels of skill, the decision to become a professional
golfer is easy. Due to the tournament pay of golf, marginal players may
be better off economically finding work elsewhere. That is because the
PGA Tour does not cover travel, clothing, and lodging for tournaments.
Entering tournaments and not taking home prize money could become a
very expensive hobby (Shmanske 2004, 194).
There are people who are able to make it as golf professionals and
join the tours. The golfers then must decide which events to enter.
Tournaments take place every weekend between January and November.
Most top performers will enter between 20 and 30 events each year
(Shmanske 2004, 195). Shmanske identifies multiple variables that affect
the number of events a golfer enters, including location, earnings up until
the event, total prize money (purse), health, and tournament competition.
Golfers who are lower in rankings will normally enter all the events they
are able (2004, 198).
Tournaments are put on by sponsors. The sponsor may be a company,
individual, organization, or golf course. The sponsor will negotiate to set
prize money, dates, and location. The sponsor will make deals with
television networks in an attempt to promote the event and sell
advertisement space. The sponsor takes on the risk of all the payouts,
including prize money and other labor costs, in hope that the revenue will
surpass costs.
The association for male touring profession golfers is known as the
PGA Tour. The PGA Tour acts as an agent for the golfers and performs
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negotiations between golfers and event sponsors (Shmanske 2004, 199).
The PGA Tour is a cartel, acting on behalf of the golfers. The PGA Tour
sets the regulations for events. There are no appearance fees. The prize
structure is as follows:
TABLE 1
Place

1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

10th

% of
Purse

18%

10.8%

6.8%

4.8%

4%

3.6%

3.35%

3.1%

2.9%

2.7%

Prize money is awarded down to 70th place, which receives 0.2% of the
purse (Shmanske 2004, 204). The tournament structure of earnings is
special to individual professional sports. Fort identifies such a
circumstance as a “winner-take-all situation.” Although a tournament
winner does not receive 100% of the prize money, the payout structure is
called winner-take-all due to the relatively large amount of prize money
first place receives. The winner-take-all situation can be used to explain
the earnings within individual sports such as racing, golf, and tennis
(2003, 202).
The demand for the sport originates from fans who desire to see the
best players competing with one another. When the best players compete
within a single event, such as a golf tournament, there will be only a
marginal difference between players. As the best compete for a share of
the prize, there needs to be some sort of assurance that the best competitor
will take home the majority of the earnings. The Lorenz curve of golf
illustrates that a small percentage of competitors earn the majority of the
purse money. The top 10% of players earn close to 55% of the event
purse. There is a reason for the highly unequal distribution of earnings
(Fort 2003, 203).
Suppose there were not a huge payoff for the top competitors at a
tournament and the differences in pay for the positions narrowed. Without
a large discrepancy in winnings for the different places, the players may
decide that it is easier to take turns winning tournaments. Players may
throw off a stroke here and there, allowing the previously determined
winner to take home the week’s check. The current prize structure for
professional golf resembles X in Table 2. If the prize structure were
changed to Y there would be a smaller difference in prize money for the
top competitors.

60

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2009
TABLE 2–Expected Value Example
Prize Structure X

Prize Structure Y

1st

$100,000

$100,000

2nd

$60,000

$90,000

3rd

$40,000

$80,000

4th

$30,000

$70,000

Expected Value

$57,000

$85,000

The relatively high expected value of prize structure Y may encourage
colluding. When the prize structure resembles X, players would have a
larger incentive to cheat, or not collude. The players would be encouraged
to produce their best performance.
Professional golf would be particularly susceptible to colluding if the
payouts resembled Y because it is very difficult to produce consistent
performances. The golfers, especially if risk adverse, may choose to
collude in an effort to “guarantee” earnings they may not have received
under normal tournament conditions. The player collusion would
undermine the goal of the tournament organizers: maximize the value of
the purse and TV contracts. If players begin to collude and share purses,
fan confidence will diminish. The diminishing confidence leads to
decreases in demand and, in turn, decreases in revenue from any given
event (Fort 2003, 203). The concentration of earnings prevents such a
problem. The incentive to collude is reduced through the prize structure
because the value of outperforming the top performers is so high. The
high competition within professional sports is what brings the buyers, or
fans, into the market for professional golf (Fort 2003, 203).
Because the top golf professionals are competing against one another
for the few, high- paying positions, the marginal improvement of golf
skills becomes very important. Players use their scarce time to practice
their golf skills as a means to improve their human capital. The human
capital theory of labor explains the value of practice time to professional
golfers. Within a labor market, workers earn money by selling their skills
to employers (Shmanske 2004, 218). Golfers earn money by “selling”
their skills to tournaments. Outside of professional sports, laborers
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typically seek education and training as a means to acquire human capital.
The laborers invest in the education or training in hopes that the increased
human capital will result in higher earnings, all else equal. A golfer that
spends time practicing over other activities believes that the payoffs he
will receive from practicing will be greater than the opportunity cost of
the time sacrificed.
A golfer spends his time practicing to increase his skill level. The
improvements of golf skills will more than likely result in an increase in
pay for the top professional golfers. The small discrepancy in skills
among players and large discrepancy in pay makes marginal skill
improvements important. Previous empirical studies have revealed that
the returns to certain skills are more valuable than others. The difference
in returns means that a player may enjoy a higher payoff from allocating
practice time to the relatively high “paying” skills.

III. Previous Research
Empirical studies have been conducted to research the monetary returns
to skill of professional golfers. These studies have included tournament
winnings as the dependent variable in the regression. The independent
variables used are measures of golf skills that can be divided into short
game and long game skills. The long game is comprised of a golfer’s
drives and approach shots while the short game includes chip shots and
putting. Further explanation of the different shots is presented within the
empirical model section of the paper.
Shmanske, who has done various economic studies of golf, evaluates
the relationship between skills and earnings of golfers on the1998 PGA
and LPGA tournaments (2000, 385). He uses a multiple regression
technique involving five skills to offer an explanation of earnings. The
skills are: driving distance, driving accuracy, approach shot accuracy,
sand bunker shots, and putting. In Shmanske’s model, putting and driving
distance are the most significant skills for males. For women it is putting
and approach shot accuracy. The results show that once skills are
accounted for, women are not underpaid compared to men. His final
conclusion is that through the predicted earnings of the male and female
model, either sex is better off staying within their tournament where
returns to their skills are higher (2000, 397).
Most recently, Shmanske has used PGA Tour micro data to create an
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empirical model regressing skills and performance on earnings (2008).
The objective of Shmanske’s empirical research is to improve upon
previous models through the use of tournament-level data. His focus is
not specifically on the return to various skills of PGA golfers, but on the
formulation of possible empirical models. The tournament-level data
Shmanske uses is not provided by the PGA. To obtain the data, Shmanske
tracked the weekly performances of the 2005 PGA Tour top 100 money
earners throughout the 2006 PGA Tour. Shmanske recorded six statistics
throughout the season. He recorded the golfers’ scores and measures of
five different golf skills exhibited throughout the Tour (2008, 647).
In order to evaluate the effects of PGA micro data as a replacement
for the usual yearly averages, Shmanske examines various models. He
tests the model with the micro level data and with the yearly averages to
allow for comparisons. The use of tournament-level data can help to
account for the different levels of difficulty of the courses on the PGA
Tour. An example of this is Tiger Woods’s scoring average. While Tiger
may have a yearly scoring average that is lower than his competitors, this
score does not fully convey his competitive advantage. He is scoring
lower on the most difficult courses of the PGA Tour. If he entered exactly
the same events as his competitors, the gap between his score and theirs
would be even wider. Shmanske is able to eliminate some measurement
error by using tournament-level data (2008, 646).
Another advantage of micro data is that Shmanske is able to examine
skewness and variance of the PGA Tour golf skills. A golfer’s yearly
earnings are not solely a function of scoring average. Shmanske shows
that variance and skewness of the year’s scores also affect earnings (2008,
647). By adding measures of variance and skewness, Shmanske’s model
increases its predicting power. The micro data and inclusion of variance
and skewness allows Shmanske to estimate a multi stage model that
improves his adjusted R² from 0.36 to 0.90 (2008, 644). Because the
weekly data is not published by the PGA, using micro data is not feasible
for this paper.
Another approach to the subject of empirical studies of professional
golf is evaluating the change in the returns to skills over time. Alexander
and Kern’s study focuses on an old golf saying: “Drive for show and putt
for dough”. The saying implies that, while fans may be in awe at the sight
of a long drive in professional golf, tournaments are won on the putting
green. If the saying holds true, a player should allocate the majority of his
practice time to his short game, where payoffs are greater. The wisdom
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of the saying has come into questions over the past few years as some golf
analysts believe driving distance is becoming relatively more important
to success on the PGA Tour (2005, 46).
Alexander and Kern present both sides of the argument about the
relative importance of driving and putting skill. There is evidence that
favors putting, or short game, as the dominant skill in professional golf.
The majority of a professional golfer’s shots are taken within a 100 yards
of the hole. Roughly 40% of a PGA golfer’s strokes are taken on the
putting green. A skilled golfer may use a driver a maximum of 14 times
in a par 72 round. Because the short game requires the majority of strokes
a PGA golfer takes, there is ample reason for him to focus his time on the
club used most often, the putter (2005, 47). There is also evidence that
has led to the belief that driving now overpowers the short game on the
PGA Tour. There has been an increase in the length of courses on the
PGA Tour in recent years. New courses are made longer and old ones are
lengthened. This places short-gamers at a disadvantage, holding all else
equal. One example of this is Corey Pavin. Pavin won the U.S. Open in
1995 and was the top earner of 1991. He improved his average drive by
17 yards in 2001 compared to 1991. Pavin remained one of the best
putters on the Tour throughout the time period, but his driving ability was
not enough to place him in the top of the 2001 Tour. Pavin finished 111th
in earnings in 2001 (2005, 47).
The purpose of Alexander and Kern’s study is to analyze whether
returns to various golf skills have changed over time or if the old golf
wisdom still holds true. They examine the determinants of earnings for
PGA Tour golfers from 1992 to 2001 (2005, 46). The model’s dependent
variable is the inflation-adjusted annual earnings of PGA Tour golfers
from official PGA Tour events. Alexander and Kern use measures of
golfer skill, number of events played during a season, a measure of time,
and a control for changes in prize money over the years as their
explanatory variables.
The skill variables Alexander and Kern include in their model can be
divided into short game and long game skills. The long game skills are
average driving distance, driving accuracy, and iron accuracy. The short
game skill Alexander and Kern include in their model is average putts
made per greens in regulation (2005, 51). The time variable is used to
account for the rapid change in golf-equipment technology over the past
15 years. Golf clubs and balls have been designed to increase driving
distance and accuracy. Some people speculate that these improvements
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are changing the relative payoffs associated with various skills,
particularly in favor of the long game where this technology is most put
to use. On the other side, courses have been lengthened in recent years.
The study includes the time variable to account for these changing
factors. The events variable is included because all golfers do not enter
the same number of events during a season. When a golfer plays
additional events, he increases his earnings opportunities. Alexander and
Kern use a prize variable to control for any changes in the total prize
money from year to year within their sample (2005, 53).
Alexander and Kern’s regression results reveal that average driving
distance and putting have the largest impact on PGA Tour golfers’
earnings. The time variable has a negative sign. A possible explanation
of this may be that golf courses have been lengthened over time to
counteract the new technology. Finally, their results show that there has
been a small increase in the marginal value of driving distance over the
period examined whereas the marginal value of putting has declined. The
single most important determinant of earnings is still putting. According
to Alexander and Kern’s study, an improvement in putting is the quickest
way to improve pay on the PGA Tour (2005, 59). The empirical model
presented in this paper is similar to Alexander and Kern’s, with the goal
to assess returns to skill of PGA golfers and changes in the returns to
skills over a select time period.

IV. Data and Model
The sample used for the regression is comprised of PGA Tour golfers
competing in one or both of the 2002 and 2008 seasons. The skill and
earnings statistics are kept by the PGA Tour and are available at
PGATOUR.com. Golfers are included in the sample if they have available
skill statistics for at least one of the two years. The sample includes 197
observations from 2002 and 196 from the 2008 season.
The model examines the influence of various golf skills on pay within
the PGA Tour. Pay is measured in 2008 dollars and includes winnings
from a year’s PGA Tour events only. In unreported results, earnings are
logged, as is typical in models with salary as the dependent variable. The
log of earnings produced results nearly equivalent to the reported model,
which has no transformations.
In order to compare the 2002 observations to 2008, interaction terms
are included. The interaction terms consist of the 2002 and 2008 skill and
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events variables. Each of the variables has 393 observations. The
observations from 2008 retain their original values within the interaction
terms. All observations from 2002 have a value of zero. An example is the
AvePutt08 interaction term calculation:
AvePutt08= (AvePutt)*(1 or 0)
1 for 2008 AvePutt observations
0 for 2002 AvePutt observations
Each interaction term provides a direct comparison of the change in
the average return to a specific skill from 2002 to 2008. If an interaction
term has a positive coefficient then the skill represented within the
interaction term has a higher return for marginal improvement in 2008
compared to the same improvement in 2002. A negative coefficient
signifies that the returns to skill are smaller in 2008 than in 2002. A
dummy variable is also included to control for any possible technological
or course changes from 2002 to 2008.
The empirical model is written as follows:
2008$ = á + â1 AvgDr + â2 DrAccr + â3 GIR + â4 SS + â5 AvePutt +
â6 Events + â7 Yr2008 + â8 AvgDr08 + â9 DrAccr08 + â10 GIR08 + â11 SS08
+ â12 AvePutt08 + â13 Events08 + å
The object of golf is to hit the ball into the hole in the fewest strokes
possible. A typical par four hole is designed so it takes a player two shots
to reach the putting green. From the green in regulation it should take
two putts to finish. The typical round is played in 18 holes with a par of
72. It is not uncommon for a professional golfer to score a 70 within a
round. A tournament typically has four, 18-hole rounds (Shmanske).
Each time a golfer takes a stroke they are attempting to execute a
skill. This skill could range anywhere from a drive to a putt. There is data
available for each skill the golfer attempts within the Tour. The long
game skills measured in the model are AvgDr, DrAccr, and GIR. The first
stroke a player uses is a drive. Drives are measured by distance and
accuracy. AvgDr is the average drive distance for a golfer over a period
of one year. Driving accuracy measures a golfer’s aim and consistency in
driving. The goal of the first drive is to hit the fairway, which is the best
position for the next stroke. The DrAccr variable is the percentage of
times the initial drive lands on the fairway.
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The second shot is used to land on the green, near the hole. This is
called an approach shot. The player’s approach shot is measured through
greens in regulation. GIR is the percent of attempts a player was able to
hit the green in regulation. This is calculated by dividing the number of
greens hit in regulation for the year by the number of holes played.
According to the PGA, a green is considered hit in regulation if any
portion of the ball stays on the green after the GIR stroke. The GIR stroke
is the stroke taken before the final two strokes within par. For example,
on a par four hole it would be the second stroke.
The final two skill variables are SS and AvePutt. Both are measures
of a golfer’s short game. In golf, not every stroke is played to perfection.
Some shots land in obstacles known as bunkers. Bunkers are normally
sand traps. The bunkers make it difficult to make par. Sand saves occur
when a golfer hits a bunker but is still able to make par. The SS variable
is a measure of sand saves. It is the number of times, in a given year, that
a golfer made par or better after hitting a bunker divided by the number
of bunkers hit.
The final strokes a golfer takes are putts. The PGA reports the
average number of putts a golfer takes after reaching the green in
regulation. By using putts resulting from greens in regulation rather than
total putts, driving and approach shot ability is factored out of the
measure. The AvePutt variable is a golfer’s year long average of putts
taken on greens in regulation. Because AvePutt is the only variable that
is a measure of strokes taken by a golfer, the coefficient is expected to be
negative.
EVENTS accounts for the number of tournaments the golfer
participates in a year. The dummy variable, YR2008, is included to pick
up any changes from 2002 to 2008. These changes include course length,
golf equipment technology, and other variables that have not been
accounted for. The skills measures with “08” endings are the model’s
interaction terms. Again, these interaction terms account for the changes
in the returns to the skill in 2008 compared directly to 2002.
Each stroke a player takes has the ability to place him at either an
advantage or disadvantage for the next stroke. This means, for example,
if a player is able to drive long, accurate distances it will make it “easier”
for him to make a green in regulation. Alexander and Kern control for
such events within their model. Approach shots, putting, chipping, and
sand saves are controlled for in order to obtain a pure measure of each
skill. The measures are created through multiple stage regression, using
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residuals as the skill variables (2008, 51). Such regression techniques are
not included in this study.

V. Regression Results
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the
regression. The average golfer on the Tour during the two years earned
$1,320,800 per year and entered an average of 25.6 events. The golfer’s
average driving distance is 288.27 yards. Approximately 64% of the time
the average PGA Tour golfer will reach the fairway with his initial drive.
A green in regulation is reached, on average, 65% of the time. After
making a GIR, the golfer averages 1.79 putts to finish the hole. The mean
of the sand save percentage is 49%.
TABLE 3–Summary Statistics
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Maximum

Minimum

2008$

1,320,800

1,179,300

11,320,000

36,583

AvgDr

288.27

8.5634

315.2

261.4

DrAccr

63.44

5.335

80.42

41.86

GIR

64.671

2.5685

71.1

54.33

SS

49.412

5.8482

68.103

34.454

AvePutt

1.7882

0.024452

1.871

1.718

Events

25.606

4.5355

36

14

0.50127

0.50064

1

0

144.1

144.04

315.1

0

DR Accr08

31.761

31.955

80.42

0

GIR08

32.473

32.485

71.1

0

SS08

24.875

25.162

63.71

0

AvePutt08

0.89645

0.89546

1.844

0

Events08

12.911

13.274

36

0

YR2008
AvgDr08
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The regression results are presented in Table 4. The GIR, AvePutt, and
Events variables are significant at the 1% level and SS is significant at the
5% level. The only perverse sign is on the Events variable. The
coefficient is interpreted as a decrease in annual earnings of $44,725 for
each event entered. Intuition would predict that as a golfer enters more
events, his earnings will increase.
TABLE 4–Regression Results
2008$

Significance

AvgDR

$2,775

DrAccr

-$29,578

GIR

$168,300

**

SS

$33,859

*

AvePutt

-$19,784,000

**

Events

-$44,725

**

Yr2008

-$8,404,000

AvgDr08

$15,563

DrAccr08

$10,952

GIR08

-$57,992

SS08

-$4,598

AvePutt08

$3,820,700

Events08

$10,906

Adjusted R2

0.2434

N
Constant

393
$26,417,000

**

**-significant at 1% level
*-significant at 5% level
The negative sign implies otherwise. The coefficient may be negative
because the number of events entered by any given golfer normally
depends on the earnings he has already accumulated for the season. Tiger
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Woods only enters select events on the Tour. If he is able to win enough
events by August, he would be reluctant to enter more events toward the
end of the Tour. His time may be better spent resting. The superior golfers
within the PGA Tour usually enter fewer events, which may explain the
negative sign on the Events coefficient. To put it differently, worse
golfers have to play more events to make enough to live on. The model’s
adjusted R² is 0.2434. The adjusted R² is consistent with labor studies but
may be considered low for a regression involving professional golf. The
relatively low adjusted R² is most likely a result of the simplified model
used.
One of the purposes of the regression is to evaluate the marginal
effects of improvements in skills on a golfer’s earnings. If a golfer was
able to improve his GIR by ten percentage points, which would take him
from the minimum GIR to the mean, his earnings would increase by
$1,683,000. Further, if a golfer could increase his sand saves percentage
from the minimum 34% to the sample mean of 49%, his earnings would
increase by $507,885. For a golfer to improve his average putts per green
in regulation from the sample maximum to the mean, he would need to
decrease his average by .0828 putts. The decrease would result in an
additional $1,638,115 in annual earnings.
None of the model’s interactions terms are significant. That implies
that, comparing 2002 to 2008, there is not a significant difference in the
returns to any of the measured skills. Had AvgDr08 been significant, for
example, the coefficient would be interpreted as how much an additional
average drive yard added to a player’s earnings in 2008 compared to
2002.

VI. Summary and Conclusions
The analysis in this paper does not provide any support to the idea that the
returns to skills for PGA golfers are changing over time. Further analysis,
which would include all of the most recent data, may improve the study.
Putting, as in previous studies, continues to be a highly significant
variable. Driving and driving accuracy are not significant in the model as
they have been in previous studies. A player’s driving ability may be
reflected in the significant GIR variable. The insignificance of driving
may also be a reflection of the golfers in the two sample years. These
golfers may already be accustomed to the long drives of today. The
physical size of professional golfers has increased and today’s golfers
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have had sophisticated golf equipment readily available for the majority
of their professional lives. The group’s strong drives may place them on
a more equal playing field than golfers in previous studies. The result
would be a weaker impact on earnings. It seems that the wisdom of
yesterday remains today: “Drive for show and putt for dough”. A wise
professional golfer will focus his time on his short game, where the
returns to marginal improvements are greatest.
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